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EXCAVATING CONSTITUTIONAL ANTECEDENTS IN ASIA: AN ESSAY
ON THE POTENTIAL AND PERILS
ARUN K.THIRUVENGADAM*
INTRODUCTION
Tom Ginsburg's exploratory article on the antecedents to constitutionalism in East Asial is a valuable addition to the existing literature
on Asian constitutionalism. My own research interests lie in constitutionalism in India specifically, and in Asia more generally, and I found
his article both insightful and stimulating. Although I appreciate the
scholarly trajectory invited by Ginsburg's article, I would like to flag
some concerns, based on debates in Indian constitutional law on the
use of historical and culturally grounded arguments, that should be
considered by constitutional scholars who seek to make traditionbased arguments in relation to contemporary constitutional law in
Asian societies. I emphasize that in many contemporary Asian societies, modern constitutionalism typically marks a radical departure
from pre-existing legal traditions. Therefore, calls invoking premodern traditions in such societies that might approximate to contemporary practices of constitutionalism have to take note of some concerns that I will raise in this comment.
I begin by summarizing Ginsburg's argument, as I understand it.
Ginsburg begins by examining the notoriously contested concept of
constitutionalism through the lens of rational choice theory to identify
what he asserts to be at its core: agency cost theory and precommitment theory.2 He also distinguishes constitutionalism from the requirements of judicial review and legality to further narrow the focus
of his historical inquiry.3 With this narrowly defined notion of constitutionalism in hand, Ginsburg examines scholarship on historical docu* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. I am grateful to Ernest

Caldwell, Juliette Duara, Michael Hor, Terry Nardin, and Victor Ramraj for constructive comments
that improved this essay and helped me avoid errors and flaws of reasoning. I remain solely
responsible for those that remain.
1. See Tom Ginsburg, Constitutionalism: East Asian Antecedents, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11
(2012).
2. See id.at 13-18.
3. See id.at 17.
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ments relating to legal and political institutions in China, Japan, and
Korea.4 After conducting a largely textual analysis, Ginsburg concludes
that these East Asian societies "had elaborate constitutions in the Aristotelian sense" as well as "proto-constitutionalist institutions that embodied substantive precommitments by the sovereign."s He further
concludes that these societies "were able to induce agents to work for
sovereigns through a combination of normative exhortation and institutional structure that constrained arbitrary behavior on the part of
both,"6 and therefore (with some qualifications) "we can indeed speak
of an East Asian constitutionalist tradition."7 Ginsburg ends by encouraging more studies to expand the relatively limited range of historically informed scholarship on constitutional law in East and Southeast
Asia.8
1.

THE VIRTUES AND PROMISE OF GINSBURG'S ANALYSIS

On my reading, Ginsburg's article has many virtues. First, by boldly identifying some core ideas at the heart of constitutionalism, it raises
issues that go beyond the scope of his discussion in ways that invite
scrutiny, given the continuing debate over the meaning of constitutionalism.
Second, as in other writings, Ginsburg moves beyond the traditional focus on countries in the Global North. The corpus of comparative constitutional law, despite encouraging trends in recent years,
continues to be dominated by Western experience and concerns. Ginsburg's article expressly seeks to "call[] into question the Western narrative of exceptionalism, in which constitutionalism and the rule of law
are seen as distinctive Western contributions." Ginsburg's argument
in this essay will hopefully lead to similar historically-oriented studies
of other constitutional traditions that are under-studied in the existing
literature.
Third, Ginsburg's call for a turn to history is motivated by a desire
to strengthen the roots of modern constitutionalism in the societies

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See id. at 18-30.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 32-33.
Id at 11.
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that he studies.io In his earlier work, Ginsburg insightfully charted the
course of contemporary constitutionalism in several East Asian nations
by displaying a sophisticated understanding of the constitutional politics that led to dramatic changes in the constitutional cultures of countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia.11 In this work, he
explains how modern constitutionalism came to be grounded in these
countries after they successfully transitioned to democracy between
the late 1980s and early 1990s and he illustrates how these countries
witnessed the emergence of strong constitutional review.12 A striking
claim made by Ginsburg-as noted by one reviewer-was the fact that
"the establishment of constitutional review in new democracies is
largely a function of politics and interests" rather than being "a reflection of macro-cultural or societal factors."13 Although Ginsburg's earlier analysis emphasized the importance of focusing on contemporary
political factors-rather than historical or cultural factors-for understanding the emergence of constitutionalism in new democracieS,14
this article can be seen as encouraging the use of historical and cultural
arguments for strengthening contemporary constitutionalisml5
II.

SOME CONCERNS OVER THE TURN To HISTORY IN ASIAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM

Having set out the positive attributes of Ginsburg's analysis, I now
focus on some concerns about the implications of his analysis and
methodology. The first of these flows from the last virtue identified
above. While I appreciate his (unstated) motivation in strengthening
the roots of modern constitutionalism in East Asia, I worry that he ig10. See, e.g., id at 13, 30-31 (concluding that "there are some materials in the East Asian
tradition that do approximate those features associated with the modern concepts of constitutions and constitutionalism," like precommitment).
11. See ToM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW INNEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INASIAN
CASES (2003).
12. Id.
13. Ran Hirschl, Book Review, 13 LAW AND POL. BOOK REV. (Dec. 2003),
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/Ginsburgl203.htm
(reviewing TOM
GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW INNEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INASIAN CASES (2003)).
14. See id. ("Ginsburg examines the politics of constitutional transformation and design in
[new Asian democracies]-all of which underwent a transition to democracy in the late 1980s
and early 1990s-as well as their newly established constitutional courts' struggle to maintain
and enhance their stature within political environments that lack an established tradition of
judicial independence and constitutional supremacy.")
15. See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 13 (asking "whether we can indeed speak of an East Asian
constitutionalist tradition. The answer is a qualified yes. East Asia has long had notions of limited
government and constraint on authority and had, at certain times and places, genuine institutional constraints on authority.").
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nores the possibly deconstructive implications that a turn to history
might have for contemporary constitutionalism in the societies on
which he focuses or for other societies in Asia. To make this point
clear, I rely on two examples. The first of these draws from a case cited
in Ginsburg's article, while the second is from an Asian jurisdiction to
which, following his call for historically-oriented research in other
Asian constitutional systems, Ginsburg's analysis could be usefully
extended: India.
A.

The Korean ConstitutionalCourt's Decision in the Capital City Case

To illustrate the manner in which his historical inquiry may be
relevant to contemporary constitutional issues, Ginsburg cites a single
example: the Capital City Case decided by the Korean Constitutional
Court in 2004.16 In this case, the Korean Constitutional Court ruled
upon the constitutionality of a statute that sought to move the nation's
capital away from Seoul.17 In striking down the law, the Constitutional
Court of Korea relied upon the notion of an unwritten "customary"
convention that had the force of law and would override statutory law
that was inconsistent with such customis The majority of the Constitutional Court held that since Seoul had been the capital of the nation
since the time of the Choson dynasty, it should remain so; thus, the
Court interpreted the provisions of the Korean Constitution to give
force to such a conclusion.19 Ginsburg argues that, to the extent that
the Constitutional Court draws attention to aspects of constitutional
law dating from the Choson dynasty that his analysis characterizes as a
constitutionalist regime, the Constitutional Court was correct to invoke
this historical argument that served to enhance "the normative power
of the Court's assertion."2o
On its face, this case seems like a good example to support Ginsburg's argument that reliance on history and pre-modern constitutional traditions can strengthen an understanding of contemporary

16. Id. at 32. See Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2004Hun-Ma554 & 566 (consol.), Oct. 21,
2004, (16-2(B) KCCR, 1) (S. Kor.), reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 112
(2006), http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/att-file/library/decision_2004.pdf [hereinafter Capital
City Case].
17. Capital City Case,supra note 16, at 122.
18. Id. at 142.
19. Id. at 138-39.
20. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 32.
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constitutional issueS.21 However, examining this case in greater detail
shows that the issue is more complex.
The Korean Constitutional Court ruled 8:1, with 7 judges holding
the law unconstitutional through a single judgment, one judge concurring separately in the result, and one judge dissenting through a separate judgment.22 In what follows, I focus on the facts of the case and the
actual judgments handed down by the majority and the dissent to identify some troubling implications of the majority's reliance on the argument from history and tradition.
The CapitalCity Case arose from an interesting set of facts.23 In the
2002 Korean Presidential elections, Roh Moo-Hyun campaigned as the
Grand National Party's candidate and made several electoral pledges.24
The most significant of these was a promise that he would relocate the
capital from Seoul in order to solve the problem of overpopulation and
to facilitate the equal development of other areas in Korea.25 In December 2002, Roh Moo-Hyun was elected the sixteenth President of
South Korea.26 To fulfill his campaign promise, President Roh's government initiated "The Special Act on the Establishment of the New
Administrative Capital" (hereinafter "New Capital Act") to build a new
capital in the Chungcheong area.27 As noted in the majority judgment,
the New Capital Act passed in the National Assembly (which sits as a
unicameral Parliament) on December 29, 2003, by an overwhelming
majority, garnering 167 votes out of the total of 194 memberS.28 Only
thirteen members voted against the Act, while fourteen abstained.29
Soon thereafter, in January 2004, the New Capital Act was promulgated
as law.3o The petitioners who brought the case before the Korean Constitutional Court in July 2004 consisted of a group of public officials,
city council members, and citizens drawn from across the nation.31
This group challenged the constitutional validity of the New Capital Act

21. Id.
22. CapitalCity Case, supra note 16, at 143-44.
23. The background context of the case and the details of the several judgments issued are
succinctly analyzed in Jonghyun Park, The Judicialization of Politics in Korea, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL'Y J.62, 75-87 (2008).
24. Id. at 75.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Capital City Case, supra note 16, at 117.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 118.
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by contending that it violated a number of their constitutionally protected rights, such as the right to vote on referendum and the rights to
equality, travel, and the pursuit of happiness.32
The majority judgment of the Constitutional Court, as noted earlier, found in favor of the petitioners and held that the New Capital Act
violated the right of citizens to be involved in revisions to the Constitution guaranteed under Article 130 of the Constitution.33 This provision
applies to explicit attempts at revising the Constitution, and the provision confers a participatory right on citizens.34 It mandates that any
attempt to revise the Constitution be made pursuant to a vote by citizens through a national referendum.35 On its face, the application of
this provision to this case is puzzling because the New Capital Act did
not seek to revise or amend any textual provision in the Constitution.36
Indeed, that foundational document does not have any textual provisions relating to the location of the capital of the national government
of Korea.37 The majority judgment conceded this crucial fact when it
noted that "[t]here is no express provision within... our Constitution
that states 'the capital is Seoul."'38 However, this fact did not deter the
majority judgment from drawing on historical facts combined with an
intriguing interpretive strategy to reach its final conclusion.
The series of steps adopted by the majority to support its reasoning merit close scrutiny. The majority judgment began its analysis of
this issue by emphasizing that the dictionary meaning of "Seoul" is
"capital," and the present Seoul area had continuously been the capital
of Korea for over six hundred years, since the establishment of the
Choson dynasty in 1392.39 The majority judgment then asserted that
these facts gave rise to the existence of a "constitutional custom ... with respect to the location of the capital [in Seoul], in light of
the historical, traditional[,] and cultural circumstance of our nation."40
The majority argued that while the primary source of constitutional
law was the text of the Constitution, there was also space for recognizing the value of "unwritten" constitutional rules or "customary consti-

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 170 (Jeon, J., dissenting).
Id. at 133.
Id.
Id.
Id
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tutional law."41 The majority judgment argued that the existence of the
capital in Seoul for over six hundred years gave rise to a customary
constitutional principle that Seoul would continue to be the capital of
the nation.42
Taking this argument further, the majority judgment argued that
once a legal norm is acknowledged as a principle of customary constitutional law, it has the same legal effect as the written text of the Constitution.43 This result would therefore mean that any legislative
enactment that sought to change the location of the capital would
amount to a revision of the text of the constitution, requiring adherence to the procedure set out in Article 130 of the Constitution.44 The
majority reasoned that, because a national referendum had not been
called in deference to the demands of that provision, the New Capital
Act violated the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 130
of the Constitution.45
Justice Jeon Hyo-sook fundamentally challenges this entire line of
argument in her dissenting judgment.46 She began her judgment by
acknowledging that Seoul had historically been the capital of South
Korea.47 However, she disagreed with the importance accorded by the
majority to this fact and criticized the majority for inferring "a normative constitutional proposition that 'Seoul should be the capital' from
[the] factual proposition that 'Seoul is the capital."'48
Instead, Justice Jeon highlighted the fact that when the law came
up for debate in the National Assembly, it had been passed by an overwhelming mandate and had garnered votes by members across the
political spectrum, including those of members from within the ruling
and the major opposition parties.49 Justice Jeon placed great emphasis
on this fact, since the National Assembly was a representative body of
all citizens of Korea, and the Constitution mandated that its actions in
passing legislation be accorded due respect and consideration.so

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

130.
138-39.
139.
143.
165 (Jeon, J., dissenting).
166.
167.
166.
170.
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Turning to the argument advanced by the majority on "customary
constitutional law," Justice Jeon was willing to concede the legitimacy
of this interpretive category.si However, she strongly argued against
treating any such principles on par with the written Constitution.52 She
noted that at best such customary principles could play a supplementary role, and could only aspire for supplemental, rather than equal,
force.53 She argued that not treating this interpretive category as such
would result in the dangerous situation where an unwritten, "customary principle" could lead to the overriding of written, textually enshrined principles of the Constitution.54 She also hinted at the
potentially arbitrary nature of this interpretive category by noting that
the majority judgment had identified only certain features as potentially falling within this category, including the capital, the Korean language, and the Korean alphabet.ss Justice Jeon argued that even for
these features, it was the National Assembly that had the requisite legitimacy to decide whether they should be varied in accordance with
the wishes of the people, whom the National Assembly represents better than any other institution in Korea.56 Justice Jeon therefore refuted
every single step in the reasoning of the majority's judgment and concluded that since no violation of Article 130 had occurred, the petitioners had no cause of action.s7
When Ginsburg endorses the majority judgment in this case, he
does not address the significant points made in Justice Jeon's dissent.58
As Justice Jeon shows with admirable clarity, the category of "history"
or "tradition" is invoked by the majority judgment to thwart a policy
that a popularly elected President sought to implement with legislative
support, not only of his ruling party, but also of the main opposition
parties. In such a situation, the use of a textually-unsupported historical argument by what is essentially an unelected body is set against the
policy choice of more representative wings of government that has
greater interpretive weight and also conforms with the written text of
the Constitution. I do not want to suggest that judges are never justified in thwarting the "will of the majority" by adopting modes of inter51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 167.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id at 169.
Id.
Id at 173.
See Ginsburg,supra note 1, at 32.
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pretation that go beyond the constitutional text. However, the classic
justifications invoked for doing so-namely, for the protection of rights
of historically oppressed minorities or women-simply do not apply in
this case.
Jonghyun Park's analysis of the CapitalCity Case references the reaction of several Korean constitutional scholars to the decision.59 After
noting that the majority's reasoning found supporters among some
constitutional scholars, Park observes that other constitutional scholars criticized the majority's rationale on several groundS.60 One line of
criticism argued that, in a civil law system such as the one in place in
Korea, it was "absurd" to contend that a principle of customary constitutional law could equal the weight given to a written provision.61 Other scholars argued that such principles were potentially dangerous and
invoked the specter of attempts by Mussolini and Hitler to repudiate
democracy.62
What I found particularly interesting was Park's observation that
the Court's attempt to invoke traditional understanding of Korean law
provided support to "conservative Confucian scholars."63 Park notes
that these scholars sought to use the idea of customary constitutional
law to defend their traditional understanding of family and to oppose
progressive action by civic groups which were seeking to jettison the
male-oriented "family head system" (Hojujedo).64 Although Justice Jeon
Hyo-sook never explicitly articulates this as a reason, I found it striking
that the first woman appointed to the Korean Constitutional Court opposed a move that would make it easier to invoke notions of traditional
Korean law and culture that would inevitably have worrying implications for issues relating to gender and minorities. In other parts of Asia,
calls for invoking pre-modern notions of culture, tradition, and law
have been viewed with concern by those pursuing rights of women and
minorities for precisely this reason. As we shall see, such concerns
have been expressed in the context of family law issues in contemporary India as well.
My emphasis here is on the potential uses of arguments based on
tradition, especially when they conflict with other interpretive categories and in situations where a genuine clash exists between the de59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Park,supra note 23, at 78.
Id. at 78-79.
Id. at 79.
Id.
Id at 86.
Id.
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mands of tradition and those of the constitutional choices made by
more recent generations.
B. The Controversy Over Callsfor Invoking Traditionaland Premodern Understandingsof Law and Constitutionalism in India
The Constitution of India, which came into force in January 1950,
was one of the first formal constitutions to be adopted in the decolonization era that followed the end of the Second World War. For this reason, India's Constitution was closely studied by framers of several
constitutions that were adopted across Asia and Africa in the 1950s
and 1960s. India's Constitution thus came to be an influential model
over time, influencing the drafting process of future constitutions, such
as the constitution-making process in South Africa in the 1990S.65
Although the Indian Constitution combined elements of legal regimes that existed in pre-modern, pre-colonial and colonial India, the
Constitution of India sought to mark a fundamental rupture from those
pre-existing legal systems by incorporating institutions and elements
that were new and informed by the modern, progressive, and nationalist ideas of its framers. In a recent study of the motivations of the framers of the Indian Constitution, Uday Mehta argues that Nehru and his
colleagues in the Indian Constituent Assembly "view[ed] the present as
the disjuncture between the past and the future, rather than the connecting tissue that linked the two."66 While acknowledging the desire
of the framers to make radical departures from what came before, it is
important to note, as Mehta emphasizes, that the Constitution of India
was not a "revolutionary" document because it continued many elements of earlier legal and constitutional orders.67 Indeed, one scholar
asserts that as much as seventy-five percent of the new Constitution
was derived from the last major colonial statute used to govern India,
the Government of India Act of 1935.68 For this reason, in Indian political discourse, critics argue that the Indian Constitution was drawn
65.

See, e.g., Arun K. Thiruvengadam, The Global Dialogue among Courts: Social rights juris-

prudence of the Supreme Court of India from a comparative perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT 264, 272 (C. Raj Kumar & K. Chockalingam, eds., 2007) (noting

that "[i]n the early 1990s, when drafts of the South African constitution were being actively considered, several detailed studies of the Indian constitutional experiences with social rights were
conducted by South African scholars.").
66. Uday S. Mehta, Constitutionalism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS IN INDIA 15, 16

(Niraja Gopal Jayal & Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds., 2010).
67. Id. at 19.
68.

SUBHASH C. KASHYAP, OUR CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIA'S CONSTITUTION

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (4th rev. ed. 2005).
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from foreign and alien ideas and did not represent the ideas of law and
justice held by the people who have historically lived in the territory
now known as India.69 For some critics, this feature of the Indian Constitution results in a problem that, in their view, affects its foundational
legitimacy.70
In 2010, the Constitution of India completed sixty years of functioning. While the constitutional project in India continues to face great
obstacles and problems, there is general agreement among constitutional scholars that the project has been successful, at least in terms of
endurance and in the achievement of some of the founding goals, even
as many others remain unfulfilled.71 The contest over the success of
constitutionalism in India occurs over many fronts and diverse issues.
To some extent, those who question the foreignness of the provisions
of the Constitution have had to mute their criticism as it has become
evident that some of those "foreign" ideals have taken root in the soil
of Indian constitutionalism. These include the decision of the framers
of the Constitution to grant all Indians universal adult suffrage at a
time when women and ethnic or religious minorities did not have the
right to vote in several "developed" nations.72 This has not, however,
caused such a critique to vanish completely because there continue to
be areas where the very "foreignness" of constitutional concepts and
ideas continue to be fundamental obstacles to the attainment of a robust constitutional culture that is also rooted in the Indian social milieu. The contested debate over India's model of constitutional
secularism is an example of an issue where critics continue to maintain
that the system in place is unsuited to the Indian context.
This near-constant tension in Indian constitutionalism is evident
in the way debates are structured over several constitutional issues.
Three such issues demonstrate the controversial nature of any assertion that seeks to invoke historical claims in Indian constitutional law.

69.

RAMACHANDRA GUHA, INDIA AFTER GANDHI: THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST DEMOCRACY

107-10 (2008).
70. See, for instance, the complaint of one member of the Constituent Assembly, K. Hanumanthaiya, who lamented that while some of his fellow nationalists had wanted "the music of
[indigenous instruments such as the] Veena or Sitar", the end-result was "the music of an English
band." The allusion is to the foreign origins and content of many of the provisions of the Constitution. 7 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES 616 (Nov. 4, 1948) (statement of K. Hanumanthaiya).
71. THE SUCCESS OF INDIA'S DEMOCRACY (Atul Kohli, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).
72. Arun K.Thiruvengadam and Gedion Hessebon, Constitutionalism and Impoverishment: A
complex dynamic, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 165 (Michel
Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds., 2012)

56

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1

An early heated debate around these issues occurred within the
Constituent Assembly, where some members who supported Gandhi's
critique of Western civilization, argued that the new constitution
should avoid the perils of totalitarianism inherent in ideas of a strong
state prevalent in Western constitutional models.73 The Gandhians
argued that independent India should opt instead for a decentralized
system that took as its starting point the village or panchayat system
that had historically been the principal unit of governance in precolonial India.74 This move was opposed by several influential members of the Assembly. B.R. Ambedkar, the Chairperson of the Drafting
Committee and the champion of the cause of Dalits (who had historically faced great injustices under the Hindu caste system) vehemently
opposed the idea.75 Ambedkar argued that "these village republics
have been the ruination of India" and famously asked: "What is the
village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness
and communalism?"76 Ambedkar's outburst was met with some equally strong comments by advocates of the Gandhian panchayat system,
one of whom asserted that Ambedkar's views were founded on an ignorance of Indian history.77 Ultimately, however, the framers chose a
centralized model of governance featuring a federal system that leaned
towards the center and concentrated power in institutions located in
the capital city of Delhi. This did not mean a complete defeat for the
panchayat system. As a compromise, a provision encouraging the establishment of panchayats was relegated to a relatively unimportant
part of the Constitution.78 As it happened, later political events caused
the panchayat system to witness a resurgence in the mid-1980s. Panchayats are now more salient in the contemporary Indian constitutional order, though no close observer would claim that the institution in
its modern contemporary form has any relation to the way it operated
in earlier times.
A similar compromise was also adopted for the second issue I focus upon here: the system of personal laws that continue to exist
73. See, e.g., CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, supra note 70, at 212-13 (Nov. 5, 1948) (statement of Damodar Swarup Seth). See also id at 1130 (Dec. 30, 1948) (statement of Pocker Sahib
Bahadur).
74. See, e.g., id at 285 (Nov. 6, 1948) (statement of Shibban Lal Saksena); id. at 350 (Nov. 9,
1948) (statement of N.G. Ranga).
75. Id. at 38-39 (Nov. 4, 1948) (statement of B.R. Ambedkar).
76. Id. at 39.
77. See id. at 219 (Nov. 5, 1948) (statement of H.V. Kamath); id at 285 (Nov. 6, 1948) (statement of Shibban Lal Saksena); id. at 350 (Nov. 9, 1948) (statement of N.G. Ranga).
78. See INDIA CONST. art. 40.
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alongside the modern constitutional framework in India. The Indian
Constitution guarantees equality and freedom from discrimination
based on gender, religion and other markers of identity.79 It also guarantees the right to freedom of religion.8o The compromise adverted to
earlier enables religious communities in India to be governed by their
specific religious codes in relation to family law matters, such as those
affecting matters of inheritance and succession, marriage, divorce, custody, guardianship.81 This recognition is another feature of the contemporary Indian legal order that seeks to recognize that the political
unit, now known as the Republic of India, was not formed on a clean
state and that its laws and people carry the imprint of prior legal regimes. In this instance, recognition is sought to be granted to the legacies of religious legal traditions such as the Hindu and Islamic
traditions. For all other matters, such as those affecting public and
criminal law, Indian citizens are treated on par, but in matters falling
within the realm of these "personal laws," they are subject to different
legal regimes. A scholar who is critical of "this contradictory embrace
of individual rights and group rights" argues that "the personal law
system creates both differential rights within the family for Muslim,
Hindu, and Christian citizens, and inequality for women."82
Scholars who celebrate the existence of legal pluralism find the
continuance of personal laws to be a salutary trend, critical as they are
of uniform, hegemonic traditions of law.83 Nevertheless, women and
disempowered minorities within each religious tradition continuously
assert their constitutionally guaranteed rights to demand equal treatment on par with men and dominant groups within each religious tradition. When such claims are presented before courts and other legal
institutions, the courts are confronted with difficult questions that
expose the contradictions underlying the compromise that cannot be
easily sorted out in ways that are legally defensible. Women's rights
activists emphasize that women are disadvantaged twice over-once
by the forces that advocate for legal plurality in the constitutional order, and again by the forces of tradition in the personal law regime that
applies to them.84 This disadvantage prevents them from enjoying full
79. Id.atart.15(1).
80. Id. at art. 25(1).
81. Seeid. atart. 40.
VRINDA NARAIN, RECLAIMING THE NATION: MUSLIM WOMEN AND THE LAW IN INDIA 5 (2008).
MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA
AND AFRICA 277 (2d ed. 2006); WERNER MENSKI, MODERN INDIAN FAMILY LAw 349-55 (2001).
84. See Narain, supra note 82. See generally FLAVIAAGNES, FAMILY LAW (2011).
82.

83. See, eg., WERNER
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citizenship rights on par with male citizens.85 The tension in family law
in India is therefore similar to that analyzed by Park's article in relation to Korea.
A third example is an important ongoing court case before the Supreme Court of India. In February and March 2012, the Supreme Court
of India heard oral arguments in a constitutional challenge to a criminal statutory provision dating back to the colonial era that criminalizes
sexual intercourse between males.86 In this case, groups asserted that
the criminal provision in question violates the constitutionally guaranteed rights of LGBT individuals.87 Earlier, the Delhi High Court, in its
judgment in the case of Naz Foundation v Government of NCT Delhi,
"read down" the provision to exclude private sexual intercourse between males, holding that without such a reading down, the provision
would violate the constitutional rights to equality, privacy, and dignity
of LGBT individuals.88 The case was brought on appeal to the Supreme
Court by an assorted group, which consisted of religious bodies and
groups, some of whom argued that allowing homosexual intercourse
went against the cultural and religious traditions represented across
India.89 This case shows that the liberal democratic and progressive
vision emphasizing the importance of individual rights sought to be
advanced by the text of the Constitution is in deep tension with other
visions of law and tradition that continue to co-exist in Indian society.
Both sides draw upon their particular visions of history, but such debates are not easily resolved because the protagonists question the
specific historical narratives advanced by their opponents. Given this
backdrop, calls for examining the history of traditions of constitutionalism that existed in India prior to the colonial era are not viewed as
neutral or objective agendas.
Ginsburg's analysis brings to mind similar attempts undertaken
by scholars in India, such as the comprehensive study of the Dharmashastrasby P.V. Kane published between 1930-1962 that runs across
85. See Agnes, supra note 84.
86. Verdict reserved on appeals in gay sex case, THE HINDU, March 27, 2012, available at
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3250607.ece
87. Id.
88. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2009) 160 D.L.T. 277 (India), available
at http://obis.nic.in/dhc/APS/judgement/02-07-2009/APS02072009CW74552001.pdf.
89. See Atiq Khan, Muslim Clerics Feel Family System Will Be Destroyed, THE HINDUJuly 3,
2009, available at http://www.hindu.com/2009/07/03/stories/2009070361341800.htm ("Homosexuality does not jell with India's 'mizaaj' [cultural ethos] and cannot be tolerated in our
society.") To be clear, similar sentiments against the High Court's judgment were voiced by representatives of all major religions in India.
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five volumes and 6,500 pages.9o Explaining his motivations for the
study of ancient Indian practices relating to the law, Kane states as
follows:
It may be asked: What in these days is the use of the study of the
theory and practice of government in ancient India? It may be conceded that the situation in which we find ourselves now and in
which we shall be placed in the near future is unique and much light
cannot be thrown by a study of the past on the solution of the problems that will have to be tackled by us. But that study has certain
useful purposes to serve.
The study of the past will give us hope and convey the assurance that
we have in the past conducted governments and administrations of
vast empires, that we have evolved theories and practices which
were not inferior to those of some of the most advanced nations of
the world, that allowed the opportunities and scope, we may rise
equal to what the circumstances may demand of us.91
It is striking that Ginsburg seems motivated by similar concerns,
which are, as I have indicated earlier, laudable goals. Nevertheless, one
has to be careful about the methodology of such a study and the conclusions one draws. To demonstrate this concern in an area I am more
familiar with, I focus upon such studies conducted by a contemporary
scholar named M. Rama Jois. Rama Jois' 1984 book, Legal and Constitutional History of India, is a recognized text in Indian law schools and
has been cited as authoritative in judgments by courts.92 More recently, in 2000, he published the second edition of Seeds of Modern Public
Law in Ancient Indian Jurisprudence.93 In both these works, Rama Jois
conducts a close analysis of ancient Indian texts and sources of law,
and, particularly in the second book, argues that analogues for many
concepts in the modern Indian constitutional system can be traced to
ancient Indian concepts of law. In both books, Rama Jois argues that
the ancient Indian principle of Rajadharma (law governing kings) is a
concept equivalent to what we mean by constitutionalism in the modern sense.94 Rama Jois trawls through, and cites extensively from, a
vast array of sources including the Dharmashastras,the Smritis, and
other important treatises to back this claim.9s
90. See PANDURANG VAMAN KANE, HISTORY OF DHARMASASTRA: ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL RELIGIOUS
AND CIVIL LAW (2d ed. 1968-1975).
91. 3 PANDURANG VAMAN KANE, HISTORY OF DHARMASASTRA: ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL RELIGIOUS
AND CIVIL LAW (2d ed. 1968-1975).
92. M. RAMA JOIS, LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF INDIA 579 (1984) [hereinafter Jos,
LEGAL HISTORY]
93. RAMA JOIS, SEEDS OF MODERN PUBLIC LAW INANCIENT INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 2000).

94. Seeid.at25.

95.

JOIS, LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 92, at 49-50.
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However, Jois makes some concessions that lead to doubts about
his claims, such as the following:
It is no doubt true that there was no forum before which any violation of the provisions of Rajadharma could be questioned. The king
himself, who was expected to obey those laws, was the highest court,
and the Smritis provided no forum for challenging the action of the
king on the ground that it was in violation of Rajadharma.96
This calls into question, rather fundamentally, whether the principles of Rajadharmacan be understood as constitutionalist in the modern sense, if they did not bind the kings who had to enforce them. As
we have seen in Ginsburg's article, Ginsburg recognizes the importance
of satisfying this requirement before attaching the label of a constitutionalist regime to a historical situation.97
In other places, Rama Jois makes claims about the unity of the Indian people and nation in ancient India that seem to contradict what
historians, political theorists and sociologists have to say about the
state of the ancient Indian polity.98 While there were sophisticated
systems of governance in place in ancient India, it is not at all clear that
analogues of modern ideas of nationalism and popular sovereignty
were also present within those systems. This points to a greater problem with much of Rama Jois' analysis: the sources he cites to show that
modern notions were anticipated by those in ancient India are invariably textual sources. While the translations and attempts to show parallels between thinking in ancient and modern Indian contexts are
interesting, without the benefit of evidence that these texts were actually applied in practice and formed the basis of actual trends in governance, the study of such texts alone provides inconclusive material
for asserting whether practices of governance in ancient India conformed to what we would now call constitutionalist practices. Scholars
seeking to follow Ginsburg's call for further such studies should bear
these considerations of methodology and interpretation in mind.

96. Id. at 585.
97. See, e.g., Ginsburg,supra note 1, at 15.
98. Jois, LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 92, at 581. Jois asserts, "While it is a historical fact that the
territory of India so described was divided into several sovereign states... By virtue of the governance of the same laws on all matters including Rajadharma, the entire population of this country constituted themselves into one People or Notion notwithstanding the innumerable political
divisions constituting separate and independent states or territories under different kings or
rulers." Id This statement is deeply problematic, as there is little evidence that the people who
lived during the time being described here were familiar with the modern notions of citizenship,
country, nation and "One People."
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CONCLUSION

Although I share the broad outlook that informs Ginsburg's historically-oriented analysis of constitutionalism in East Asia, I have sought
to draw attention to potential problems of making historicallygrounded arguments in relation to contemporary Asian constitutionalism. American constitutional scholarship is quite familiar with the
problems of the "turn to history" that it has encountered since the era
of "originalism" was inaugurated in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
However, a concern that does not emerge in that discourse, but is particularly salient for constitutional discourse in Asia, is the possible neglect of the important consideration-to which Ginsburg's earlier work
has done much to sensitize us-that in many Asian societies, contemporary constitutional practice reveals radical departures from preexisting traditions of law and constitutionalism. Drawing upon the
Indian experience, I have sought to provide examples of three specific
situations where such problems typically arise.

